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Aaron Kelly
University of Edinburgh
“I just tell the bloody truth, as I see it”:
James Kelman’s A Disaf ection,
the Enlightenment, Romanticism and 
Melancholy Knowledge
The assertion by the troubled teacher Patrick Doyle – “I just tell the 
bloody truth, as I see it” (p. 112) – in James Kelman’s novel A Disaffection 
goes to the heart of  Kelman’s own aesthetic of  showing things as they 
are. However, the qualifying clause – “as I see it” – also suggests that 
truth is not evidentially absolute and immediate but provisional or 
situated. Of  course the very concept of  truth would seem to require of  
itself  a totalised fulﬁ lment of  its own promise. That is, truth should be 
completely and self-evidently veriﬁ able as an absolute or else it begins 
to collapse into its opposites: falsity, ﬁ ction, imagination, discursive for-
mation and so on. If  truths are perceived or construed by differing sub-
jects in variant ways then truth as such would appear to be merely a 
series of  constructions which then lack the very thing which they would 
nominate: truth’s unmediated actuality. Historically, it was the task of  
Enlightenment science and rationality to reconcile subject and object 
under the rubric of  truth, to sustain mutually the secure certainty of  
both mind and world in reasoned acts of  veriﬁ cation. But if  the truth 
of  the world is only ever and already a construction of  the thinking 
subject then the truth of  both instead becomes a ﬁ ction, a fallible ima-
ginative mechanism. The order of  reason, the science of  fact, the law 
of  objectivity are all reduced to the foundational myths of  the thinking 
subject and its ﬂ awed and conjectural efforts to assert its own certainty. 
Such a proposition – that truth cannot realise its own absolute – has 
of  course become the mainstay of  what is considered the postmodern 
condition. From Michel Foucault’s sense that knowledge is a produc-
tion of  power (and vice versa) to Jean-François Lyotard’s account of  the 
“crisis of  metanarratives” which supported the Enlightenment ideals of  
truth, rationality, progress (and indeed, according to Lyotard, the reﬂ ec-
tion of  those ideals in the teleological faith of  Marxism and the Left), the 
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postmodern has sought to undermine the ideological basis of  objectivity 
in its scientiﬁ c, social and historical terms. 1 Worse still, truth is not only 
a conceptual antinomy, a semantic contradiction of  abstract science; the 
current postmodern critique also accuses Enlightenment rationality of  
providing the myth of  righteous objectivity by which systems of  domina-
tion have legitimized themselves. In this sense, truth’s only residual verity 
is the fact of  its complicity in power.
This postmodern antipathy to Enlightenment values follows on, to a 
large degree, from perhaps the most famous critique of  systemic reason 
in terms of  modernity: Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 opus, Dialectic 
of  Enlightenment. There are, however, also some important divergences 
between Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique from the standpoint of  
modernism and mass culture and postmodernism’s anti-Enlightenment, 
especially in relation to notions of  art and culture, which will be consi-
dered in due course since they bear directly upon the politics of  Kelman’s 
sense of  truth and reality. The key aspect of  Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
attack is that Enlightenment science positioned itself  as the overthrow of  
myth and superstition yet it became the very thing (myth) which it fei-
gned to supplant. Which is to say, Enlightenment science effaced itself  by 
becoming its own self-sustaining myth. Its instrumental rationality sought 
to systematize all things into an ordered totality yet it feared the limits of  
its own regime of  truth. As Adorno and Horkheimer put it:
Man imagines himself  free from fear when there is no longer anything 
unknown. That determines the course of  enlightenment […] Nothing at all 
may remain outside, because the mere idea of  outsideness is the very source 
of  fear. (p. 34)
Enlightenment is then transﬁ gured from a project of  uncovering 
reason and truth to an apparatus of  totalitarian domination: it brutally 
imposes its regimes of  reason and truth upon the world and either subor-
dinates or obliterates anything which cannot be systematized and regu-
lated within the terms of  its own conceptual strictures. The horrors of  
the twentieth-century – in particular, the annihilation of  what is other in 
the form of  Nazism and the Holocaust – led Adorno and Horkheimer, 
and many subsequent thinkers, to regard the instrumental systema-
tization of  Enlightenment reason as culminating in the unreason of  a 
  1. See Michel Foucault, Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, trans. 
Colin Gordon, John Mepham and Kate Soper, Brighton, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980; and Jean-
François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff  Bennington and Brian 
Massumi, Manchester, Manchester U.P., 1988; and Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phases in 
Dispute, trans. George Van Den Abbeele, Manchester, Manchester U.P., 1988.
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rationality that must know and dominate in equal measure and conse-
quently exterminate all that remains intractable to it. So in pursuit of  
the same Enlightenment ideals of  what is true and right, the objectivity 
of  science and reason transforms into irrational barbarity. In Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s words: “Enlightenment with every step becomes more 
deeply engulfed in mythology” (p. 12).
Hence, an apparently rigorous regime of  scientiﬁ c scrutiny and ratio-
nal objectivity ends up occluding truth: “there is to be no mystery – which 
means, too, no wish to reveal mystery” (Adorno and Horkheimer, p. 5). 
Clearly, then, Enlightenment reason and the truths which it sustained 
have become increasingly strained across the last century and into the 
present one. However, if, more recently, the current canon of  postmodern 
thought accuses the Enlightenment of  propagating a regime of  truth 
that only serves to dominate the world, to construct a truth incapable 
of  acknowledging anything resistant to or outside of  its instrumental 
ordering, then perhaps a circumspection is also necessary with regard to 
postmodernism’s evaluation of  truth as merely a production of  power, 
of  the narrative, conceptual order of  domination’s  self-legitimation. For 
if, as alleged, Enlightenment truth would deny a voice or a stake in the 
world to all those who remain incommensurate with its self-image, then 
surely the postmodern position where there is no truth is not the sub-
version but the fulﬁ lment of  such an enterprise. To deny – universally 
and absolutely, it should be stated with some irony – the whole basis of  
truth as anything other than a ﬁ ction amongst ﬁ ctions is also to further 
de-legitimate any project of  resistance or emancipation which struggles 
to articulate the truth of  ongoing suffering and injustice. Put another 
way, where the Enlightenment is critiqued for imposing a dominant truth 
which denies the truths of  others, or alternative versions of  truth, so too 
the postmodern proclamation that there is no truth achieves a similar 
end through exactly the inverse logic. For such a dispensation further 
impedes any effort to challenge its own dominant, absolute premise by 
denying the status of  truth to any constituency who would offer alterna-
tives to postmodernism’s play of  relativized discourses. In simple terms, 
where once the vanquished were instructed that their truths were false 
because the Enlightenment possessed the monopoly on truth, now the 
position is that such truths are untrue because there is no such thing as 
truth. Kelman’s A Disaffection offers a different pathway across these fault 
lines and it arrives at what I will term a melancholy knowledge or truth. It 
is a melancholy knowledge in this novel because it mourns the loss of  
some pure truth uncontaminated by the instrumental domination of  the 
Enlightenment’s own concept and the horrors committed in the name of  
the latter. Yet A Disaffection also yearns for the persistence of  truth, for a 
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critical engagement with the world, even as it acknowledges the fragmen-
tary, fractious and provisional nature of  that knowledge. A melancholy 
knowledge is still of  form of  knowing though it exists in a negative rela-
tion to truth: that is, it forgoes its place in some systemic absolute that has 
become domination’s mythology but reiterates that truths must be known 
if  the world is to be understood let alone changed for the better.
For oppressed groups – for those on the receiving end of  history – the 
Enlightenment has always been a fractious and troubling inheritance or 
disinheritance. The Enlightenment promised progress, emancipation, 
reason, illumination and truth yet the world is still riven by poverty, suf-
fering and oppression that dim the ideals of  the former. Is it that the 
oppressed need more of  the Enlightenment: that is, once Enlightenment 
values are properly universalized, when everyone is allowed to share 
them, will poverty and suffering then be banished? Or, is the world the way 
that it is precisely because the Enlightenment cannot be universalized? In 
other words, poverty and suffering persist because the Enlightenment’s 
credos of  reason, freedom and progress were never universals but the 
privileges enjoyed by some at the expense of  the many. As such, truth, 
freedom or emancipation would have to be rethought so that they are not 
simultaneously grounded in their opposites. So is it the ongoing project 
of  enlightened modernity to overcome ﬁ nally the injustices and of  the 
world or was such a project always the myth of  an instrumental reason 
that accorded beneﬁ ts to some at the same time that it also served to 
legitimize colonialism, slavery, the inequalities of  class society and capi-
talism, world war and racial extermination programmes? If  history’s vic-
tors have always thwarted full emancipation then they should not also be 
allowed to monopolize or sully the very project and ideal of  emancipa-
tion, for that would indeed be their ﬁ nal victory. My term, melancholy 
knowledge, therefore, is intended in this context to insist that there still 
be truths, even if  the ﬁ rst awareness of  such knowledge is that enligh-
tened modernity has become the codeword for a barbarism conducted as 
reason. Melancholy knowledge is thus a truth troubled by its own name.
Kelman’s A Disaffection is highly germane to debates about the damage 
done to truth and reason by the motors of  history given that it is replete with 
allusions to Enlightenment thought and also to the Romanticism which 
functions as a critique of  the former, emanating from the times of  revol-
ution and social turmoil in the late eighteenth century. In Patrick Doyle’s 
desperate imagination, the heavyweights of  German idealist philosophy, 
such as Hegel, or German Romanticism, such as Goethe and Hölderlin, 
are repeatedly invoked. In particular, Kelman’s novel permits a rethink-
ing of  the role that art and culture might play in complicity with, or in 
opposition to, regimes of  instrumental reason. In so doing, A Disaffection 
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is instructive precisely because it is critical of  the Enlightenment but also 
wary of  the notion of  a pure art of  Romantic redemption uncontami-
nated by domination. It is this diagnostic analysis of  Romanticism in 
Kelman’s novel which sets it apart from the aesthetic utopianism of  the 
latter day Romantics of  postmodernism. Where postmodern thinkers 
such as Lyotard connect reason, truth and Enlightenment to a civilized 
monstrosity (and dismiss Marxism and other collective projects of  eman-
cipation as pandering to the same totalitarian or repressive rationality) 
it is, supposedly, only in art that some form of  transcendence is possible, 
that some space might be found that is not bound by systemic power 
and social degradation. According to such a position, in a world where 
mechanised domination masquerades benignly in narratives of  ethical 
improvement or scientiﬁ c progress, where freedom is despoiled by the 
false choices of  consumer capitalism, art offers itself  as a experience of  
arresting, transcendent singularity. It is at this juncture, however, that such 
postmodern aesthetic utopianism can be distanced from Adorno’s version 
of  art in a way that bears directly upon A Disaffection. To fully understand 
Adorno’s theory of  art, it is necessary to reclaim the Marxian strands of  
his thought rather than cast him as a detached aesthete in which guise 
he is then made to prepare the ground for the latter day Romanticism of  
the present which ﬁ nds in literature a Sublime that escapes the supposed 
contamination of  the social and political. Anyone such as Adorno, who 
can look down their nose at jazz music (of  all the things to pick upon in 
the context of  commodiﬁ cation!) has surely made snobbery – perhaps 
aptly enough – a ﬁ ne art. But equally, Adorno’s work provides a forceful 
methodology by which the politics of  aesthetics in Kelman’s ﬁ ction can 
be unfolded.
By way of  establishing a disparity between Adorno’s approach and 
that of  the postmodern Sublime, Adorno did certainly grant art its own 
laws of  formal autonomy, yet his account of  the aesthetic also retains a 
negative relation to the world, to the social materiality out of  which the 
artwork is made but to which it is not bound. Indeed art and its pro-
mises are troubled by the very inequalities of  the world that they would 
resolve. Lyotard’s postmodern Sublime, or what is now claimed as a New 
Aestheticism, proposes a very different order of  aesthetic utopianism that 
would escape the mechanized rationality and standardized banality that 
characterize contemporary capitalism. 2 Oddly though, in this admix-
ture of  idealism and Romanticism, such thought ﬁ nds in literature a neo-
 Kantian Sublime which Kant himself  located beyond literature or art. 
  2. For a lively, engaging collection of  essays propounding a New Aestheticism, see John J. Joughin, 
and Simon Malpas (eds), The New Aestheticism, Manchester, Manchester U.P., 2003.
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Jacques Rancière has saliently identiﬁ ed the contradictions in Lyotard’s 
effort to assert an aesthetic Sublime outwith the degradations of  enligh-
tened modernity by discerning how it conﬂ ates Kant’s moral (and extra-
artistic) Sublime with Edmund Burke’s poetic Sublime. 3 So for today’s 
Neo-Kantians or Neo-Romantics art is the repository of  the Sublime. A 
deep irony emerges here too in the sense that Lyotard and others bemoan 
the totalizing domination of  the world by an instrumental reason yet they 
end up constructing their own absolute, a “literary absolute” in the words 
of  Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. 4
This article will largely critique this postmodern Sublime or literary 
absolute in class terms with reference to Kelman’s ﬁ ction, but it is also 
worth pointing out that a lot of  the current aestheticism has a basis in 
Martin Heidegger. There have been numerous attempts to rehabilitate 
Heidegger, to engage in his de-Naziﬁ cation if  you like. Such efforts would 
make Heidegger’s Nazism retractile where he himself  never apologised. 
Most problematical for those who would defend or absolve Heidegger 
are his notorious Rectoral address at the University of  Freiburg in 1933 
and his An Introduction to Metaphysics (which reﬂ ects the sentiments of  
that address). 5 In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger praises what 
he terms the “greatness” and “inner truth” of  Nazism. This work also 
conveys Heidegger’s sense that it is only the German language which 
inherits the rightful descent from ancient Greek as the carrier of  origi-
nary presence, spirit and unity that is then often conﬂ ated with soil, earth, 
blood. It is, according to Heidegger, the “historical mission” of  Germany 
to rescue the “darkening world” and its “emasculation of  spirit” (p. 45). 
Although Heidegger’s defenders would construe such claims as unfor-
tunate but pragmatic concessions to Nazi ideology as a means of  pre-
serving his career and status, it is not so easy to separate Heidegger’s 
supposed token support for the Nazi regime from his wider work on the 
decayed nature of  Being in a fallen world. For someone like Heidegger 
it is only in rare moments of  art – especially his favoured writers such 
as Hölderlin – that there is a break in the continuum of  time, an open-
ing of  some primordial Being beyond the contamination of  modernity’s 
mediocrity and alienation. 6 Heidegger set himself  the philosophical task 
  3. See Jacques Rancière, The Future of  the Image, trans. Gregory Elliott, London, Verso, 2007, 
p. 109-142.
  4. See Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of  Literature 
in German Romanticism, trans. Philip Bernard and Cheryl Lester, Albany, State U. of  New York P., 
1988.
  5. See Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven, Yale 
U.P., 1959.
  6. See Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstader, New York, Harper, 1971.
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of  reaching such a clearing where Being opens up once more as pure 
promise, where in the midst of  our modern distress the advent of  the 
gods is upon us, a unity and oneness that Heidegger invests in the pre-
modern. Notoriously of  course, while waiting for the advent of  the gods 
Heidegger decided that in the meantime a Fuhrer would sufﬁ ce.
Obviously not all aesthetic purists are Nazis – far from it. But it is 
worth noting how Heidegger’s version of  a literature of  pure promise 
permits a number of  his defenders or inheritors to detach – or at least 
to attempt to detach – his politics from his aesthetics. More widely, then, 
it is worth remaining circumspect about any form of  aestheticism which 
claims that its version of  aesthetics ﬁ nds an art beyond the political 
or indeed that it is in itself  as a form a criticism beyond politics. So if  
 Heidegger is an extreme case, there is a more general effort in the New 
Aestheticism or postmodern Sublime to assert that art not only offers our 
means of  escape from the deprivations of  the world but also that art is 
reduced by the crudity of  politics. This new school of  reworked idealism 
and Romanticism claims that the singularity of  the artwork – the pure 
promise of  its Sublime openings – is sullied by political or sociological 
abstraction whether this be in the form of  Marxism, say, or identity poli-
tics where literature is produced or appreciated in terms of  working-class 
community, for example, or African-American history, lesbian culture or 
decolonizing resistance in the Caribbean. Such contextual, political or 
social issues and identities get in the way, it is proposed, of  the irreducible 
singularity of  art’s particularity, its aesthetic autonomy. And, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Kelman’s work has been attacked from precisely this pers-
pective by Thomas Docherty, whose own preferred term for this kind of  
artistic Sublime is aesthetic democracy. According to Docherty, literature 
is a means by which the self  becomes other rather than a space of  self-
ratiﬁ cation. It is an experience of  alterity or otherness so that identity is 
disrupted or made better and more generous by the sublime singularity 
of  aesthetics. Any literature or reading of  literature undertaken in terms 
of  a politics of  identity, Docherty claims, are gross reductions of  aesthetic 
potentiality that ultimately fail to win the status of  culture proper. Hence, 
for Docherty, the whole idea of  a working-class culture lacks this capacity 
for and hospitality to otherness which demarcates the transformations of  
aesthetics. So Kelman becomes a target as an example of  a literature that 
degrades this absolute hospitality. Docherty states his case as follows:
To put this in perhaps polemical terms, we have no culture (no hospitality) 
when we read an other that bears a name and a social status (for example, 
when we read, say, James Kelman for the sake of  his identiﬁ cations with or 
identiﬁ ability as “working-class Glaswegian”). In these readings, there is no 
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hospitality, and as a consequence, no culture at all. I do not say, of  course, 
that we do not read such writers. Rather, I argue that we seek a reading 
based in friendship or hospitality according to which I accept that I cannot 
know what it might mean to be an “authentic working-class Glaswegian”, 
or a “black woman”, or indeed any other category associated, in the end, 
with a politics of  identity. A hospitable reading attends to singularity, on the 
grounds that anything else is both egocentric and inimical to culture, growth, 
Bildung. (p. 40)
In this interpretation, both Kelman in his “identiﬁ cations” with 
 working-class Glasgow or readings of  his work that engage class poli-
tics are not really culture and literature at all. Docherty relates that he 
is sick of  people reading as a particular identity: as a working-class 
Glaswegian, as a black lesbian, as an Irish nationalist, etc. Given Roland 
 Barthes’s account of  the ex-nominating operation of  bourgeois ideology 
– its capacity to un-name itself  yet shape everything in a bourgeois 
society as apparently natural or self-evident – the notable absence from 
Docherty’s weary, long litany of  reductive identities is reading as a bour-
geois. 7 This aporia helps to introduce a class politics to this apparently 
generous account of  an aesthetic democracy. For Docherty’s major claim for 
aesthetic singularity is that it is the true place where democracy happens 
in a world governed by consumerism and standardized commodities and 
identities. Docherty posits that “it is in art and in aesthetics that we ﬁ nd 
a privileged site or a paradigm of  the very potentiality of  selfhood that 
establishes this democratic condition” (p. XVIII). There is something of  
liberal humanism in this aesthetic utopianism in the sense that if  you 
are naïve enough to take it on its own terms then it is very difﬁ cult to 
ﬁ nd anything much with which to disagree. However, again like liberal 
humanism, this aesthetic democracy fails to take into account the vast 
revolutionary transformations that would be necessary for its platitudes 
to be freely available to all. What is most contradictory and most telling 
in Docherty’s above statement is his claim that art offers a privileged site 
in which democracy happens. Surely any democracy worthy of  its own 
name cannot emanate from privilege.
Docherty’s position – that acts of  aesthetic appreciation by a privi-
leged subject can escape the deprivations of  capitalism – simply reworks 
the anxious call by Kant and others for a republic of  the learned in the 
wake of  the French Revolution and the shock that it is not only philoso-
phers who can think about or transform the world. So too Docherty’s 
aesthetic democracy reserves for a cultured elect any opposition to the 
  7. See Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers, London, Vintage, 1993, p. 139.
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market and thus it not only denies the status of  culture to any art which 
diverges from such aestheticism but also, politically, arrogates any pos-
sible resistance to capitalism (collective action, armed struggle and so on) 
other than the oxymoron of  a privileged democracy of  art. By making 
freedom the preserve of  an aesthetic democracy, oppressed groups must 
collectively give up their own liberation, which is then renamed someone 
else’s culture. But art is not so pure. And this is why the Marxist strands 
of  Adorno’s aesthetic are in need of  reclamation. While Adorno advo-
cated the formal autonomy of  art he also insisted that it remained a part 
of  the world to which it nonetheless resides negatively or critically. In 
contrast to Docherty’s aesthetic democracy of  pure freedom, Adorno’s 
work instructs that culture exists precisely because what it promises does 
not. That is, the freedom and autonomy promised by art are not freely 
available to all but bought at the price of  unfreedom and inequality. As 
Adorno argues: “All culture shares the guilt of  society. It ekes out its exis-
tence only by virtue of  injustice already perpetrated in the sphere of  
production.” (Prisms, p. 26) So too, then, culture as Docherty and the 
New Aestheticism would deﬁ ne it exists precisely because freedom does 
not. In a world of  inequality art is always complicit in what it would cri-
ticise, given the inequalities embedded in the making of  both culture and 
society. So rather than moving us towards a universal freedom, such a 
privileged aesthetic democracy only serves to preserve a freedom chained 
to its own opposite.
Docherty’s approach is also problematic in that he attacks what he 
perceives as a reductive notion of  working-class culture in the same 
breath with which he harangues consumer capitalism as though it were 
the working class who were responsible for consumerism. If  anyone is 
to blame for the dominance of  neo-liberal economics and consumer-
ism today it is obviously the bourgeoisie and bourgeois society – ano-
ther moment of  bourgeois ex-nomination in Docherty’s manifesto – the 
very same bourgeois society which also regulates the deﬁ nition of, and 
access to, art and culture. Hence, Docherty’s neo-Romantic notion of  a 
pure culture in opposition to society or consumerism collapses into that 
which it opposes: the fracture of  bourgeois society. Contrastingly, Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s critique of  the Enlightenment refuses any neat divi-
sion between mass culture and High culture, or culture and society more 
generally. Adorno and Horkheimer comment:
The purity of  bourgeois art, which hypostasized itself  as a world of  freedom 
in contrast to what was happening in the material world, was from the begin-
ning bought with the exclusion of  the lower classes – with whose cause, the 
real universality, art keeps faith precisely by its freedom from the ends of  the 
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false universality. Serious art has been withheld from those for whom the 
hardship and oppression of  life make a mockery of  seriousness, and who 
must be glad if  they can use time not spent at the production line just to 
keep going. Light art has been the shadow of  autonomous art. It is the social 
bad conscience of  serious art. The truth which the latter necessarily lacked 
because of  its social premises gives the other the semblance of  legitimacy. 
The division itself  is the truth: it does at least express the negativity of  the 
culture which the different spheres constitute. (p. 135)
In these terms Docherty’s opposition of  an aesthetic democracy to 
consumer culture forgets the implication of  High culture in the same 
social processes which produce mass culture and inequality. Culture can 
only promise a democracy in whose forestalling culture is already mourn-
fully implicated. There is a moment of  transference in Docherty’s think-
ing whereby his reductive homogenization of  “working-class Glaswegian 
identity” actually functions to shore up an assured and assumed sense 
of  “we”, of  the community of  aesthetic subjects, so that an aesthetic 
democratic community is produced by the act of  denying others the 
same potentiality, difference and heterogeneity. Thus, Docherty’s pri-
vileged self  becoming other than itself  is the embodiment of  a democracy 
that is in fact based on a reductive notion of  other, lower selves denied 
the sophistication of  the aesthetic polis. Given that the New Aestheticism 
calls for a renewed sense of  aesthetic and formal particularity, a close 
engagement with form, it is worth pointing out that Docherty – in 
accusing Kelman of  some homogeneous working-class Glaswegian 
identity – completely misreads the narrative register of  Kelman’s work 
and the processes of  subjectivization therein. There is no settled nar-
rative subject in A Disaffection or Kelman’s other novels – whether at an 
individual, communal or narratorial level. Instead Kelman’s work conti-
nually shifts its narrative mode between ﬁ rst, second and third person 
positions individually and collectively. “I”, “ye”, “you”, “he”, “one” all 
continually modify one another in Kelman’s ﬁ ction in perpetual irre-
solution. At the level of  content, Patrick Doyle’s vocation as teacher in
A Disaffection ensures that he is unreconciled with his own working-class 
background, but equally entails that working-class milieu is already frag-
mented and internally ruptured so that there is no reconciliation of  the 
individual with society, or, for that matter, the individual with itself  or 
society with itself. Additionally, Doyle’s consciousness in A Disaffection 
is – at the level of  form – conﬂ icted against itself  since it interminably 
shifts out of  its own person while, from the opposite perspective, the third 
person narrative can only disclose its own limits and dissolution back into 
ﬁ rst and second person modes. There is no “one” who speaks for all in 
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some consensual, superintending mode which relates Doyle’s plight to the 
reader. At the same time, Doyle has no settled, homogeneous or resolved 
self  which coheres in the form of  character and narrative consciousness. 
Aptly, given that A Disaffection continually alludes to Hölderlin, Kelman’s 
narrative technique is structurally close to the parataxis which Adorno 
discerned in the poetry of  Hölderlin: that is, the disintegration of  the 
subject position and the syntax of  logic which normally enthrone and 
legitimize the subordination of  the object to reason. Adorno writes of  
Hölderlin that “by shattering the symbolic unity of  the work of  art, he 
pointed up the untruth in any reconciliation of  the general and the par-
ticular within an unreconciled reality” (“Parataxis”, p. 127). Similarly, 
Kelman’s character Patrick Doyle is perpetually paratactic in that his 
consciousness is impinged upon by a narrative voice which in turn is also 
discontinuous and provides no consensual commensurability between 
“I” or “he”, the ﬁ rst and third person registers which harmonize the 
individual and society in the conventional novel.
Moreover, Docherty’s account of  some reductively homogenous 
notion of  a Glaswegian working-class identity is completely out of  step 
with Kelman’s ﬁ erce strain of  individualism that actually, if  anything, 
bears traces of  Docherty’s own idealised neo-Romanticism. It is less that 
Kelman opposes some collective identity to the enlightened self  or the 
transcendental “I” and more that Kelman’s ﬁ ction ends up providing a 
critique of  prevailing individualism by virtue of  the fact that it believes 
in the individual so deeply but yet cannot universalise the promise of  
individual freedom in working-class contexts. Indeed, in Some Recent 
Attacks Kelman himself  is keen to pitch his own work as attuned to the 
nuances of  individual experience and existence and at the same time a 
con comitant freedom associated with that individual lens – in a rejec-
tion of  more collective or communal identiﬁ cations that are offered as 
reductive abstractions:
What actually is the proletariat? Or for that matter the bourgeoisie? How do 
you recognise a class of  folk? Or a race of  people? You recognise them by 
general characteristics. When we perceive a member of  a class we are not 
perceiving an individual human being, we are perceiving an idea, an abstract 
entity, a generality; it is a way of  looking that by and large is the very opposite 
of  art. Artists should be able to look at what they do and know when it is not 
wrong, they need to value things for themselves – especially their own work. 
(p. 11)
Notably, such generalities are in fact deemed “the opposite of  art”. 
Art, therefore, is proposed as a distillation of  particularity, of  concrete, 
embedded truths which eschew generality and catchalls. However, 
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Kelman also has to concede that people are oppressed in collective or 
communal forms and that they are misrepresented or underrepresented 
both politically and artistically:
[…] such groups of  people wouldn’t have been found in society. They are 
marginalised, conﬁ ned below stairs, kept out of  reach in a housing scheme, 
stuck in a closet, on a reservation, a homeland, a ghetto, an inner or outer 
city slum, whatever. And when you were standing there in some particular 
company, the servant or chap who carries the painting, you wouldn’t be there, 
no one would “see” you, that concept of  “invisibility” again. (p. 15)
So Kelman’s own pseudo-Romantic creed of  individualised artistic 
freedom and truth has to face the fact that such perspectives are socially 
mediated and that the disenfranchisement of  people in collective forms 
ensures that such individualism is neither absolute nor fully realisable. 
It is in this sense that Kelman’s work is instructive as to the limits of  
individualism – this aesthetic interrogation of  individual subjectivity and 
consciousness – precisely because Kelman believes so ﬁ ercely in a liber-
tarian notion of  the individual. The critique resides – negatively – in the 
incapacity of  Kelman’s narratives to realise fully an individual freedom. 
This inability to implement the promise of  individual freedom itself  
divulges that individualism is not such an individual matter after all. 
Instead, the individual is just as socially mediated as the proletariat or the 
bourgeoisie in the above passage from Kelman. Hence, it is important 
to ascertain how the governing concept of  the individual actually helps 
structure the class inequalities of  society rather than it standing deﬁ antly 
outside such determinations. Kelman’s inability to reconcile an indivi-
dual with itself, to make the individual coincide with its own autonomy, 
demonstrates that the total freedom disbursed under the name of  indi-
vidualism is not universally possible. The liberty which capitalism offers 
as its ultimate outcome is rather the overlay of  an ongoing unfreedom 
through which the freedom of  the few continues to the cost of  the many. 
As such, this failure in Kelman to make the individual absolutely indivi-
dual returns us to its social basis in a capitalist society.
In a class society, the opposite of  the declaration we are all not the same 
is not we are all different. Such a proposition passes off  inequality as hetero-
geneity. Of  course capitalism standardizes as much as it stratiﬁ es. There 
is honour in the scorn of  prevailing platitudes and received opinions, 
especially in a world which manufactures consensus as the foreclosure 
of  radical transformation. But the heroic pose of  the bourgeois subject 
guarding its privileged autonomy from its object – a corrupting world – 
collapses in on itself. The apparently self-sustaining monologue of  this 
autonomous solitude is itself  structurally and mutually dependent upon 
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its own object which it must therefore then silence. And that object is the 
clamouring of  collective, accumulated unfreedom and oppression. The 
self  as private property is only conceivable in the forgetting of  collective 
deprivation. The pervasive individualism of  bourgeois society infers a 
free-thinking subject in masterful control of  its object and immune from 
the contamination of  that object – the social. Yet it is the toiling, disen-
franchised hordes who are not the hindrance which the self-creating indi-
vidual must transcend in achieving its freedom but instead the very basis 
for the production of  that subject. For this reason, when the bourgeois 
individual would seek to make itself  identical with its own autonomy it 
is therefore also haunted by its own social ground, by the object whose 
unreconciled injustices persist. Any uncritical hankering after individual 
freedom forgets the social mediation necessary for the freedom enjoyed 
by speciﬁ c social classes: that is, the collective unfreedom and attenuation 
of  individuality necessary for the ideology of  freedom to permeate bour-
geois society. In other words, a freedom deserving of  its own name – a 
freedom freely open to all – is only possible through the overthrow of  the 
very bourgeois, capitalist society that would arrogate freedom as one of  
its many monopolies.
So in Kelman’s writing it is less that there is an abstract or meta-
physical confrontation between the individual and the social, with the 
former a bastion of  freedom fending off  the encroaching, standardizing 
requisitions of  the latter. It is more that the two collide. Most clearly, the 
contradictions of  individualism not only inhere within bourgeois ideo-
logy but also when other social constituencies seek to avail of  individual 
freedom. To be working-class is already to be cast as the object – the 
non-thought, the non-identical – of  someone else’s modes of  subjectivity, 
to be bound by the unfreedom of  a class system which liberates someone 
else. So when a working-class subject claims as its right the universal 
freedom enthroned by bourgeois individualism a stark antinomy occurs. 
The apparent universalism of  bourgeois freedom falls in on itself  in dia-
lectical reversal which shows that the only absolute of  such freedom is the 
unfreedom upon which it depends. Hence, in Kelman’s narrative struc-
tures, terms such as stream of  consciousness or interior monologue are inap-
propriate since there is no free-ﬂ owing subject able to coincide purely 
with itself  and represent the world in its own terms, or even to withdraw 
into recasting the world in the private property of  a subjective autonomy. 
Rather, there is a continual collision whereby differing registers of  subject 
position antagonistically fail to reconcile themselves with one another or 
with a world that is itself  unreconciled.
Undoubtedly, Kelman’s narrative technique is very close to what 
became known as free indirect discourse and which is largely seen as a key 
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component of  Modernist ﬁ ction. Hugh Kenner’s Joyce’s Voices is an exem-
plary shaping of  what is now a critical common place about free indirect 
style in Modernist ﬁ ction: that is, the ability of  an author to withdraw from 
the style of  his or her narrative and to allow a character’s consciousness 
to colour the tone and shape of  what is still ostensibly a third person 
perspective. Kenner uses a passage involving the character Uncle Charles 
in A Portrait to illustrate this thesis: “The normally neutral narrative voca-
bulary pervaded by a little cloud of  idioms which a character might use 
if  he were managing the narrative.” (p. 17). However, my own preferred 
term for Kelman’s narrative strategy would be unfree direct discourse. Which 
is to say, you do not get an easy ﬂ ow from narrator into character in 
A Disaffection but rather the collision of  a narrative and a character that 
are not only heterogeneous and unreconciled to one another but also 
to themselves. No shared, overarching focalization is possible whereby 
the discourse may move freely across subject positions. There is only the 
direct impacting of  discourses that are unfree or bounded by their situa-
tedness in hierarchical registers of  language and a society stratiﬁ ed by 
inequality. In this class context, there is no autonomous subjectivity in 
A Disaffection, or, more radically, any mediating discourse in the form of  
a superintending narrative form which consensually makes that subject 
agree its place in society.
Just as the social basis of  the individual in A Disaffection rebuts Docherty’s 
aesthetic democracy of  a privileged subject becoming other with itself  in 
contrast to the supposedly homogeneous identities provided by capita-
lism, so too Kelman’s novel undermines the cultural means by which this 
apparent transformation of  the self  takes place, by returning art to its 
social implication. At one level, there again appears to be some common 
ground between Kelman and the New Aestheticism in that Doyle’s hap-
pening upon a pair of  discarded industrial pipes at the back of  an arts 
centre and his subsequent transﬁ guration of  them into musical instru-
ments are all rendered in the language of  a kind of  singular, sublime 
event that deﬁ es representation: “It was really beautiful. Of  a crazy sort 
of  nostalgia that would aye be impossible to describe in words, and not in 
oils either.” (p. 1) Where Doyle’s profession as a teacher clearly links him 
to the co-option of  culture and education by the state, there is nonethe-
less an underlying Romanticism in his desire that the pipes might offer an 
escape from all that, an art of  pure promise that is still possible. He strives 
to keep the rationalizing legacy of  the Enlightenment – his own “concep-
tualising” as he calls it – at bay by advancing an untainted spontaneity of  
the imagination with regard to the pipes which is evidently a Romantic 
need for transcendence of  the social and of  the conceptual ordering of  
things by reason. Doyle is continually troubled that his thinking about 
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the pipes seems to defer interminably his material grasp of  them. His 
decision to paint the pipes reﬂ ects self-critically on the production of  a 
rational art, insofar as Doyle feels that his own attempt to make the pipes 
artistic or enhance them aesthetically actually distances him from their 
physical materiality. So too, at a philosophical level, Doyle fears that the 
whole conceptual framework of  thought also ruins the truth of  his dis-
covery rather than deepening it. For example:
[…] and yet, this conceptualising. Creating a distance already. Only a couple 
of  days since the ﬁ rst sounds and now here he was attempting to get away 
from it, from the actual physicality of  them. That was hopeless. That was the 
kind of  thing he always seemed to be doing nowadays. The totality of  it: the 
totality of  it; the way the sounds had been the other night, or was it last night, 
the way the actual sounds had been, that was it – that was it! How come he 
had even felt the necessity of  painting them in these bright enamels? What 
was wrong with their own colour? Their selfcolour? What was wrong with 
that, their self  colour, the colour of  their selves? Had that also been done to 
create a distance? […] It could even relate to ﬁ eld-theory, the whole thing, 
the sound and the number, insofar as such a theory ever managed to appear 
in relation to the lives of  ordinary individuals, the manner in which each 
person, each organism, related to things as a totality, that old business of  
harmony, linked in the universal chain. And how in the name of  fuck did the 
two guys with cudgels relate to that! Stuck fast in the mud, the miring quick-
sand – like the wee dog. Belabouring each other with those stout sticks. That 
magnetic force – an enactment? between the men just? or did Goya himself  
have a physical part in it? And what the hell did it matter anyway. This was 
him off  with the concepts once again. Theoretical webs, dirty webs, fusty 
webs; old and shrivelling away into nothingness, a ﬁ ne dust. Who needs that 
kind of  stuff. Far far better getting out into the open air and doing it, actually 
doing it, something solid and concrete and unconceptualisable. (p. 9-10)
In the above passage apposite reference is made to the work of  the 
Spanish artist Francisco de Goya, whose own career ended in the despair 
of  the Pinturas negras or Black Paintings, murals painted on the internal 
walls of  his own home. Goya’s art spans the revolutionary period of  the 
late eighteenth century and into the nineteenth and his ﬁ nal haunted 
works signal not only a crisis of  faith in Enlightenment reason and but 
also an implacable disillusion with the hopes of  social change also under-
taken in the name of  progress as a supposedly reformist alternative to 
the existing order in both Spain and France. The abject monstrosity of  
Goya’s pathologically introverted last paintings signal his pessimism that 
old horrors will intensify rather than dissipate. The illumination of  art can 
only paradoxically shed light on the darkness which engulfs it. Kelman 
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makes explicit reference to Duelo a garrotazos or Duel with Clubs from the 
Black Paintings, which depicts two men mired in mud battering each 
other with cudgels. Goya’s two ﬁ gures locked in eternal, self-destructive 
combat is inserted here at the moment that Doyle deliberates that it is the 
burden of  the Enlightenment and of  art to inﬂ ict a violence on things in 
reducing them to the strictures of  a totality of  conceptual relationships 
which effect the particularity and truth of  the pipes in their material sing-
ularity. Instead of  reason, illumination or progress there is stagnation 
and the subordination of  the object, of  the non-identity of  the world, to 
the deadening sameness of  a brutally instrumental rationality.
Kelman’s take on Goya’s Duelo a garrotazos is then despondently 
extended to history and he deploys it to structure Patrick’s despair at his 
brother Gavin’s racist attitudes which surface when discussing a child 
who has been knocked down by a man from Pakistan:
What is the connection between being a man who is a Pakistani who has 
knocked down the wee boy who is now in intensive care o brother that the 
relationship includes you and me and your kids plus Nicola and the existence 
of  maw and da and the ancestors, erupting their way out of  the sewage 
system, when some form of  fucking enlightenment, some form of  fucking 
enlightenment.
Let’s us just for fuck sake go up and visit the wee boy in intensive 
care and then go and visit the guy that was driving the car that knocked 
him down: let us just do that as a beginning. Me and you o brother ya 
bastard except that we cannot talk, as a beginning. Let us talk. Even just 
as a beginning. What is that. There isni a beginning. There is no begin-
ning. You cannot discover a beginning. No beginning exists. There aren’t 
any at all. There are two blokes in quicksand with cudgels belaying each 
other. There are two blokes one of  whom is the ignorant Gavin Doyle 
from Cadder man and the other is the ignorant man who may or may not 
be from Pakistan (p. 305).
History is not progress but a stalled dialectic that has ossiﬁ ed in inter-
necine violence and racism. The collective purpose of  the class struggle 
and its solidarities collapse into atomized, directionless conﬂ ict without 
structure or resolution. The fact that Doyle imagines his family emerg-
ing from the sewage system (a sharply selected example of  civilization’s 
achievements!) transmits a Beckettian, excremental view of  history that 
returns its reformist intent to an elemental reality beneath its surface 
motors. Notably, in this passage Enlightenment tails off  syntactically 
in the gapped sentence and paragraph which hesitates unresolved with 
“some form of  fucking enlightenment”. And this parataxis, this gap in 
the syntax of  thought, itself  discloses a sense that the Enlightenment 
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has not fulﬁ lled its own rational ends. The very repetition of  the phrase 
“some fucking enlightenment” coupled with its paratactic inconclusive-
ness  collapse the teleology of  progressive reason in on itself  so that it 
is only ever the depleted repetition of  its own instrumental, self- sustaining 
logic. Given that A Disaffection is the one novel by Kelman which so brims 
with the Romanticism that seems to shape his own vision of  art and 
the artist, then it would appear that culture is offered as the only means 
by which the stalled, repetitive nightmares of  enlightened modernity 
and progressive reason can be transcended or escaped. This reading of  
 A Disaffection is most viable in the moment where Doyle tells the story of  
the pipes to Gavin’s children who are watching the television:
I want to tell ye a story. It’s about a pair of  magical pipes […] So what 
actually happened was this: I was round the back of  this building, down 
a very dark and shadowy lane, an eerie and dank-smelling lane with high 
moss-covered dykes that kept out the light, where owls were hooting and cats 
miaowing in a very controlled but semi-scary way; you should’ve heard these 
damn owls and cats my ﬁ ne friends! […]
naw, no kidding ye, it was quite scary; I mind at one minute I happened to 
look up, and there I saw this little grey cat stalking along the very top of  the 
highest wall, its round eyes glistening by the glare of  the moon high up there 
with its old pockmarked face going back thousands and thousands of  years, 
and this cat, its hairs all bristling like thin wee jaggy spikes […]
and for one quiet, very very quiet and drawn-out, long, long, solitary soli-
tary majestic moment in time, I thought like running, running fast, running 
away fast, getting away quick, quick quick quick […]
so what I did, I just bent down and lifted one up, because do you know 
this weans, I had a sudden wee think to myself  that I wanted to play a tune 
[…] it was an urge, like a magic spell had befallen me. It was as if  these two 
pipes themselves were calling out to me to come and play me come on and 
play me, so I lifted one up and what I did I just, okay, blew into it, and out 
came this long and deep sound that made me think of  scores of  and scores of  
years, and generations and generations and generations of  people all down 
through the ages, and this tune – not exactly a tune, more of  a sound, the one 
kind of  long sound that you could occasionally pause from doing, then start 
again as if  ye hadni stopped at all except when you came to the very end of  
it you would know about the pauses you did, they would all be a part of  it. 
It was really really beautiful weans and it made me think of  magic. I’m no 
kidding ye on. Magic. These pipes had something special about them and it 
was a magical something. (p. 298-299)
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Doyle’s discovery of  art arrests the normal ﬂ ow of  time and histo-
rical inevitability. The pipes provide a magic which provokes a form of  
yearning that seems to traverse history and momentarily solve or at least 
suspend its fractures. Doyle’s “solitary” moment also transcends its own 
reclusion since by telling Gavin and his family this story both the pipes 
and Doyle’s narrative about them have connected with others and trans-
formed them too. It is not only generations hailed from some historical 
repository but also Doyle’s own fractious family who are brought to share 
the transﬁ guring power of  art. Here then is a kind of  neo-Romantic 
faith that out of  despair art may redeem, that out of  the darkness comes 
illumination in the unexpected, particular and redemptive way in which 
aesthetic singularity erupts. In this interpretation the aesthetic imagina-
tion does ﬁ nally grant reconciliation in sublime transcendence that is 
otherwise absent in Doyle’s social circumstances. However, the fact that 
the dark scene at the back of  the arts centre in which Doyle ﬁ nds his 
salvational pipes is thronged with owls and cats also alludes to a work 
by Goya; and though the trace of  Goya here is much less explicit than 
the other references in A Disaffection this resonance helps complicate a 
straightforward reading of  the novel as proposing that society’s ﬁ ssures 
can be circumvented by the pure release of  art. The work in question by 
Goya is Plate 43 from his Caprichos, the etching El sueño de la razón produce 
monstruos. The title of  this work encapsulates its visual ambivalences. In 
English, it can be rendered – depending on how you wish to understand 
El sueño – as either “The sleep of  reason brings forth monsters” or “The 
dream of  reason brings forth monsters”. 8 The etching itself  depicts a 
sleeping or cowering, belaboured thinker at his writing desk besieged by a 
rabble of  owls, cats and bats against a dark backdrop (and the inscription 
El sueño de la razón produce monstruos is scrawled on the philosopher’s table). 
This image is either a potent manifesto for the Enlightenment or the 
most searing derogation of  its contradictions. If  the etching confronts us 
with the nightmare of  what happens when reason sleeps and lets down 
its guard then it is clear that the Enlightenment and culture are what save 
us from barbarism. Plate 43 is thus a cautionary image which terriﬁ es us 
with what art keeps at bay. Conversely, if  the image directs us to consider 
that it is exactly the dream of  reason which brings forth monstrosity – in 
other words, that the Enlightenment is an illusionary myth which is 
  8. For more, see in particular John J. Ciofalo’s “Goya’s Enlightenment Protagonist: A Quixotic 
Dreamer of  Reason”, Eighteenth-Century Studies, n° 30.4, 1997, p. 421-436. Also useful are Paul Ilie’s 
“Goya’s Teratology and the Critique of  Reason”, Eighteenth Century Studies, n° 18, 1984, p. 35-56; and 
John Dowling’s, “The Crisis of  the Spanish Enlightenment: Capricho 43 and Goya’s Second Portrait 
of  Jovellanos”, Eighteenth Century Studies, n° 18, 1985, p. 331-359.
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grounded in the violence and suffering caused by its pathological reason 
and self-legitimation – then this etching is actually a stark adumbration 
of  twentieth-century critiques of  the Enlightenment’s contradictory effects 
such as Adorno and Horkheimer’s. Goya’s image is then a ﬁ tting work 
with which to haunt Doyle’s artistic awakening in A Disaffection since 
it retracts the utopian purism of  Lyotard and the postmodern Sublime 
and retains a much more ambivalent awareness that art is torn violently 
in conﬂ icting directions by its promise of  redeeming a sullied world and 
its simultaneous implication in the inequalities of  that same world which 
falls short of  redemption.
Therefore, Patrick Doyle’s own phrase – “some fucking enlighten-
ment” – can be read as rhetorical dismissal: i.e., “some fucking enlight-
enment that was”. But, equally, it can also function as an expression of  
yearning, of  a need for some fucking enlightenment. And the syntactic 
gap after this phrase can then also serve to presage that incomplete, unre-
conciled requirement; it can express a restive demand that there still be 
truths. So A Disaffection shoulders a melancholy knowledge: rather than 
give up on reason or truth for the lure of  a sublime aesthetic beyond 
representation, this novel still harnesses “bloody truth” and “some fuck-
ing enlightenment” instead of  pushing any truth content into a neo-
Romanticism transcendence of  politics and society. While the bloody 
truth and the fucking enlightenment refuse their conscription by the 
absolute categories and conceptual totalities of  Enlightenment rationality 
(and the violence done in the name thereof), they also ground a situated 
knowledge which knows not only its own limitations but also its own exi-
gency. In contrast to the postmodern Sublime or the New Aestheticism, A 
Disaffection permits the awareness that just because art is not homologous 
with society this does not mean that art is homologous with itself. Where 
the Enlightenment sought to reconcile subject and object in its rational 
bind, the current Neo-Romanticism of  Thomas Docherty and others 
appears to have given up on the world and wishes instead to recon-
cile art with itself, to reconcile an aesthetic subject in its own aesthetic 
object (art’s singularity) while at the same time quarantining society in 
its deﬁ led, consumerist standardization of  itself. By contrast, the melan-
choly knowledge of  A Disaffection cannot ﬁ nd in art the transcendence of  
the degradation of  the social since the escape supposedly offered by art 
is already socially mediated by the world’s constitutive inequalities which 
make both society and art possible in their current forms. It is not only 
consumer culture that would feign to distract us; so too aesthetic purism 
would forget the suffering which helps brings art into being even as art 
promises to assuage it. As Adorno puts it:
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The abundance of  real suffering tolerates no forgetting […] Yet this suffe-
ring, what Hegel called consciousness of  adversity, also demands the conti-
nued existence of  art while it prohibits it; it is now virtually in art alone that 
suffering can still ﬁ nd its own voice, consolation, without immediately being 
betrayed by it. (“Commitment”, p. 188)
Furthermore, Kelman’s use of  Goya’s Black Paintings and their inti-
mations of  a harrowed modernity are especially germane in view of  
Adorno’s comment:
To survive reality at its most extreme and grim, artworks that do not want 
to sell themselves as consolation must equate themselves with that reality. 
Radical art today is synonymous with dark art; its primary colour is black. 
(Aesthetic Theory, p. 39)
A Disaffection retains a commitment to the potentialities of  art but it is an 
art that sheds light on its own darkening by the injustices of  the world in 
which it is made, injustices which the melancholy truth of  art’s protecto-
rate cannot betray without betraying itself.
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